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Abstract
The paper derives a normative model for partial fiscal equalisation based on a number of
axioms and allows for the existence of a specific fiscal need in the jurisdictions. The
theoretical model is then empirically tested for the case of the European Union using data
from 1986-97. It is found that most restrictions of the model appear to hold, in particular,
relatively richer countries contribute more and those with greater fiscal needs, approximated
by the importance of the agricultural sector, pay less. However, in the EU, an adjustment of
net payments to changes in the actual importance of the spe-cific fiscal need for a country is
lacking. 
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I. Introduction 
Fiscal equalisation is an important aspect of the set-up of a multitude of forms of federal 
government. In setting up equalisation schemes between jurisdictions within one federa-
tion, both efficiency (insurance) and redistributive goals can be achieved. In practice, it 
is difficult to distinguish between those motives. A highly contested question centres on 
the type of fiscal equalisation that is being perceived as fair.  
  Like many studies involving value judgements, this paper sets out to derive an 
idealised fiscal equalisation scheme based on an explicit axiomatic foundation. Using 
explicit criteria that should be fulfilled by the final equalisation scheme is a helpful way 
to guide the debate. One can disagree with the axioms, but if one accepts those, one 
must also accept the conclusion, which we define as fair. Consequently, we attempt to 
apply only those axioms that have the potential for gathering widespread support.  
A unique feature of our model is the incorporation of specific expenditures to 
cope with certain needs in the member countries of the fiscal union, which allows for a 
more realistic modelling of the redistribution of funds than usually employed in the 
theoretical literature. Fiscal equalisation is often directed at particular disadvantages of 
fiscal jurisdictions, which are beyond their immediate control. By directly including the 
idea of ‘fiscal need’, we explicitly incorporate this feature of the real world. This also 
makes the analysis more applicable to empirical data.   
The theoretical results show that key variables for the determination of net con-
tributions are average gross income of the union and gross income of the respective 
member states, as well as average gross specific expenditures and local specific expen-
ditures by the union.  
As a next step, an explicit and empirically estimable functional form is directly 
derived from the theoretical model. In the empirical section of the paper, this idealised 
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model is applied to the European Union (EU) to test whether the theoretical considera-
tions are reflected in this example of a fiscal equalisation scheme. Since member-state 
contribution to the EU is a hotly debated issue, being able to compare the actual distri-
bution of funds with an ideal scheme might facilitate a rational and educated discussion.  
Sometimes redistribution within the EU is portrayed as lacking all foundations 
for a fair system. Instead, it is regarded as the unsatisfactory result of a power struggle 
between governments. We do not disagree with the statement that political power plays 
a role in determining many aspects of the equalisation scheme. However, we believe 
that simply dismissing the outcome of such negotiations as unfair is throwing the baby 
out with the bath water. As will become apparent in our empirical analysis, the EU 
equalisation scheme does, to a certain extent, conform to a specific version of a fair 
redistribution allowing for specific fiscal needs. Note, however, that we do not take the 
effect of a redistribution scheme on efficiency into account. When we speak about an 
ideal redistribution system, we refer to the outcome of our axiomatic analysis, which 
does not include the aspect that different redistribution schemes may generate differing 
deadweight losses.  
In the empirical part of the paper, we combine observations from EU member 
countries over the time period 1986 to 1997 to form a panel data set of per-capita vari-
ables. First, it is tested whether the coefficients on EU average variables are equal in 
absolute value to the coefficients on the member-country variables. Second, imposing 
this restriction and using deviations from EU average values as regressors, it is then 
analysed whether the empirical results correspond with the idealised theoretical model. 
The final section contains a summary of the results and a brief discussion of the 
implications for economic policy. 
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II.  Axiomatic approach towards fiscal equalisation 
Fiscal equalisation
1 takes place among n jurisdictions, where  . Jurisdiction i, 
, is characterised by (non-negative) gross income  , by certain (non-
negative) expenditure   (= specific fiscal need), and by the (non-negative) population 
. In order to simplify notation, total income 
3 n ≥





1 j j Y Y , total expenditure 
 and the share in population  ∑ = =
n
1 j E E j ∑ = =
n
j i i Z z
1 j Z , 1 i ,  n , K = , are defined. Net 
income   in jurisdiction i, i , depends on gross income, expenditure and 
population in all n jurisdictions 
i F n , , 1 K =
(1)  , where   and  .  () n 1 n 1 n 1 i i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F F K K K = ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F 0 Z
n
1 j j > ∑ =
  It is natural to base fiscal equalisation on gross income and population. Due to 
various reasons, however, certain expenditures could be included separately in the fiscal 
equalisation scheme. For instance, because of external effects or an uneven distribution 
across jurisdictions. In the context of an axiomatic approach, a specific fiscal need 
should receive special consideration if this reflects the intention of the entire federation. 
How this consensus has been derived does not concern us here.  
An equalisation method is considered which, apart from other properties, iso-
lates each jurisdiction from certain changes in other jurisdictions.  
                                                 
1   The axiomatic approach towards fiscal equalization is closely related to Buhl and Pfingsten (1986, 
1990, 1991). However, there exists a large strand of literature dealing with a fair distribution of funds. 
See, for example, Moulin (1987) and Young (1988).  
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Definition 1: An isolating partial fiscal equalisation method satisfies
2  
(A1)  () 0 Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F n 1 n 1 n 1 i = K K K  if  0 Z E Y i i i = = = , 
(A2)  , 
(A3) 
() Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F
n
1 i
n 1 n 1 n 1 i = ∑
=
K K K




() ≤ ≤ − K K K , for all i, i n , , 1 K = , 
(A4)  ( ) n j K i Z , ,K 1 n j Z , , Z , E , , E K K i 1 n j i 1 i , E , , E , Y , , Y , , Y , , Y F K K K K K Z , , ,  
 =  ( ) n i Z , , Z K j , , Z , K 1 n i , Z , E , , E , K K j 1 n i j 1 j , E , , E , Y , , Y , , Y , , Y K K K K
n , , 1 K = n , , 1 j K =
F , 
  for all i, j, i , , i
K
j ≠ , 
(A5)  () ( ) n Z ,λ 1 n , Z ,λ 1 n 1 E , , E , Y , , i n 1 n 1 n 1 i F Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Y = K K K K K K , 
 for  all  0 > λ , 
(A6)  ( ) ( ) n 1 n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Z ~ , , Z ~ , E ~ , , E ~ , Y ~ , , Y ~ F K K K K K K =
k j j Y
, 
 where  Y Y ~ + 0 Y = ,  ~
k = m m Y Y ,  ~ =
k j j E E E
,  
  ~ + = 0 E ,  ~
k = m m E E , ~ = k j j Z Z Z , ~ + = 0 Z ,  ~
k = m m Z Z , ~ =
n , , 1 m K = j m
, 
  for all m,  ,  ≠ ,  k m ≠ , 
  for all i, j, k, i ,  n , , 1 K = n , , 1 j K = , n , , 1 k K = ,  i j ≠ ,  k i ≠ ,  . #  k j ≠
  The first four properties define a pure sharing funds method. The empty jurisdic-
tion property (A1) says that net income in a jurisdiction without people, gross income, 
and expenditure ought to be zero. In other words, money should not be given to empty 
jurisdictions. Property (A2) postulates a full distribution of funds. The described fiscal 
equalisation method is a pure sharing funds method. Thus, total income net of expendi-
                                                 
jurisdiction under consideration. 
2   All properties with the exception of the first property should be fulfilled for all feasible values of 
income, fiscal need and population. Only property (A1) considers special parameter values for the 
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ture has to be the same before and after partial equalisation. Property (A3) introduces a 
lower and an upper bound. No jurisdiction is burdened with more than total expenditure 
and the net income after equalisation should not exceed total income of the entire fed-
eration. Property (A4) states anonymity. The assignment of numbers to jurisdictions is 
irrelevant.
3 
  Properties (A5) and (A6) impose restrictions on funds sharing methods. Property 
(A5) assumes homogeneity of degree zero with respect to population. Proportional 
population changes in all jurisdictions do not alter the net income of any jurisdiction. 
Property (A6) states independence of mergers outside the jurisdiction. This property 
requires that a merger between two jurisdictions does not affect any other jurisdiction. 
On the one hand, this axiom is derived from the subsidiarity principle. As long as there 
are no external effects, a merger should be just an affair of the acting jurisdictions. On 
the other hand, property (A6) rules out strategic mergers between jurisdictions to the 
disadvantage of outsiders. Finally, property (A6) also ensures that rich jurisdictions are 
not interested in mergers of poor jurisdictions.
4 
Monotonicity of the fiscal equalisation method is required to preserve incentives 
and to maintain the order of jurisdictions: 
Definition 2: A monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method fulfils 
(A7)   is non-decreasing with respect to  ,  
  for all i, j, i , , 
(A8)   is non-increasing with respect to   
( n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F K K K
n , , 1 K = , , 1 j K =








risdiction under consideration. 
3   An approach that violates anonymity is discussed by Aczél and Pfingsten (1993). 
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  for all i, j, i , , 
(A9)   is non-decreasing with respect to  , 
  for all i, i
n , , 1 K = n , , 1 j K =
) , , Y F Z ( 1 n E , , E , Y K
n , , 1 K
n 1 i K 1 n Z , , Z , K i
= . # 
ℜ i : F
() E ,
() E ,
n , , 1 K
1 n E , , E , Y K
Y f f Y Y = ℜ
Y f f E E = ℜ
=







n 1 n Z , , Z , K
  Property (A7) is monotonicity with respect to gross income. Property (A8) is 
monotonicity with respect to expenditure. Property (A9) is monotonicity with respect to 
its own population. Properties (A7) and (A8) ensure that net income in a certain juris-
diction is not negatively affected through the specific equalisation method employed 
when incomes in other jurisdictions increase and is not positively affected when fiscal 
needs in other jurisdictions increase. Axiom (A9) reflects a basic condition for distribu-
tional fairness. An increase in population in one particular jurisdiction should not de-
crease the available funds for that jurisdiction.  
  Using these definitions, the following main result can be derived (and is proven 
in the appendix). 
Theorem 1: If net income functions  ,  ℜ → +
n 3 n , , 1 i K = , constitute an isolating 
partial fiscal equalisation method, i.e., if they satisfy properties (A1) till (A6), there 
exist functions  
  , where  , 
  , where  , 
so that, for all i, i , 
   
  () () ( [ ]z E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y i E Y i E i Y f 1 E E , Y f Y E , Y f − + − = . #  ( )) ( ) ( ) − −
                                                                                                                                               
4   In Germany mergers of states matter. For example, federal grants and fiscal equalisation grants from 
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  The theorem states that an isolating partial fiscal equalisation method requires 
net income in a particular jurisdiction to depend on its own gross income, on total in-
come, on its own expenditure, on total expenditure and on the population share. More-
over, the net income function is a linear function of the population share of the jurisdic-
tion, and the coefficient in square brackets is determined by total income and total 
expenditure. Very small jurisdictions will take the coefficient as given since their own 
income and expenditure have only minor influence on the functions f  and  .   Y E f
As shown in the appendix, monotonicity properties and range requirements for 
the functions   and   have to be imposed for monotonic isolating partial fiscal 
equalisation methods. 
Y f E f
Theorem 2: A monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method requires (a) that 
 [f ] is non-decreasing [non-increasing] with respect to Y and non-
increasing [non-decreasing] with respect to E and (b) that 0
() E , Y fY ( E , Y E )
() 1 E , Y fE ≤ ≤  and 
 have to be fulfilled.  #  ( Y f 0 Y ≤ ) 1 E ≤ ,
  A natural monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method is described by 
the next theorem: 
Theorem 3: Net income functions  ,  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F n , , 1 i K = , constitute a monotonic 
isolating partial fiscal equalisation method, i.e., they satisfy properties (A1) till (A9) for 
Y > E, if for all i,  n , , 1 i K = , 
(2)  () n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F K K K ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i z E d 1 Y c 1 dE cY − − − + − = , 
where the real numbers c and d fulfil 0 1 d c ≤ ≤ ≤ . # 
Proof: Equation (2) satisfies (A1), (A2), (A4), (A5) and (A6). (A7) is guaranteed by 
.   ensures (A8). (A9) is ensured by c 1 c 0 ≤ ≤ 1 d 0 ≤ ≤ d ≤  since Y > E. Due to 
                                                                                                                                               
rich states would have been reduced if Berlin and Brandenburg had merged.  
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1 c 0 ≤ ≤ ,  ()Y Y c 1 cYi ≤ − +  and thus  ( ) Y Yz c 1 i i cY ≤ − + , for all i. Hence, because of 
 the upper bound determined by (A3) is not violated. By a similar argument, it 
can be shown that the lower bound of (A3) is fulfilled.   QED 
1 d 0 ≤ ≤









− − i i
arctan
z E Y + − =
/ ) x π
  However, not only (2) is a monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation 
method. For instance, the following scheme also fulfils properties (A1) till (A9) (see the 
appendix for the monotonicity properties), provided that Y > E, 
(3)  ()
. 
 Since  arctan( 0 ≤  for x ≥ 0, by a similar argument as in the proof of 
theorem 3, it can be shown that (3) lies in the interval determined by (A3). 
2 / 1 <
With respect to gross income and population, the partial equalisation method (2) 
has been suggested by Buhl and Pfingsten (1991).
5 Neglecting expenditure (and also 
federal funds which have been considered by Buhl and Pfingsten), a comparison of the 
two approaches is worthwhile. Properties total distribution (A2), anonymity (A4), ho-
mogeneity of degree zero with respect to population (A5), independence of mergers 
outside the jurisdiction (A6), and monotonicity with respect to gross income (A7) and 
population (A9) are common axioms. However, because of the lower and upper bound 
introduced by axiom (A3) this paper does not require monotonicity for theorem 1. 
Moreover, the empty-jurisdiction property (A1) is not explicitly stated in Buhl and 
Pfingsten (1991). They, however, require additionally what they call independence of 
population distribution and independence of the length of the equalisation method. The 
former property requires that migration between jurisdictions should not affect other 
 
5   See also Buhl and Pfingsten (1986, 1990). 
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jurisdictions. The latter property is formally (adapting our notation to the case without 
expenditure) 
(4)  ( ) ( ) n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , Y , , Y F Z , , Z , Y ˆ , , Y ˆ F K K K K +  
 =  ( ) n 1 n n 1 1 i Z , , Z , Y ˆ Y , , ˆ Y K K + Y F + . 
Independence of the length of the equalisation method is a strong assumption. It leads to 
a functional form that includes sums of individual jurisdiction values for income and 
expenditure. The coefficients in this specification are independent of aggregate values. 
Due to this property, in the scenario described by Buhl and Pfingsten the equalisation 
method (2) is not only sufficient – as stated by the previous theorem – but also neces-
sary. 
III.  Partial fiscal equalisation in the European Union 
The EU is an interesting and topical case for assessing the practical importance of an 
idealised fiscal redistribution framework. Although no explicit fiscal equalisation 
scheme exists in the European Union, only a small fraction of EU expenditures (roughly 
8%)
6 is allocated to common purposes. This implies that the major part of EU expendi-
tures directly flows back into member countries. These direct flows to and from the EU 
can be interpreted as reflecting a fiscal redistribution policy across member countries.
7  
An important question in the empirical analysis is the choice of an appropriate variable 
to capture a specific fiscal need. The EU is a very good testing ground for this reason, 
as it is relatively easy to determine the main fiscal need. In our view, this is the agricul-
                                                 
6   Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (1999), p. 3. 
7   Some caveats of such an interpretation are listed in Bundesbank (1999), p. 65. 
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tural sector, as expenditures on agriculture are still the most important single item in the 
EU budget (51% in 1996).  
The data cover the time period 1986-97 and up to 14 countries.
8 All series are in 
ECU and in per-capita terms.
9 Net contributions to the EU budget are derived by sub-
tracting direct EU payments to member countries from ‘own resources’ of EU by mem-
ber country.
10 The importance of the agricultural sector as a special fiscal need is 
proxied by the ratio of gross value added of the agricultural sector (including forestry 
and fishing) to overall gross value added in market prices (AGR). Gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) is used as a proxy for gross income.
11 Variable names with a subscript i 
denote values for EU member countries and names without a subscript are average EU 
values.  
  This section empirically analyses whether the implicit fiscal equalisation scheme 
in the EU is in line with the ideal scheme derived in the theoretical section.
12 For that 
purpose, the monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method (2) with constant 
coefficients will be used to derive an explicit functional form.  
The net income function (2) can be written as  
                                                 
8  Luxembourg is excluded from the analysis as relevant data are missing. Some data on agricultural 
shares are missing for Greece and Portugal, reducing the number of observations from 141 to 135. 
9   Data are taken from various issues of Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, which is compiled by 
the Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, Germany. 
10  Although the EU cannot levy its own taxes to generate revenues, it nevertheless has its ‘own re-
sources’. These consist of custom duties (17% in 1996), agricultural levies (2%), value-added tax 
share (48%), and GDP share (33%).  
11  GNP could be considered a more appropriate income aggregate in this context. However, there are 
difficulties in getting consistent data for the sample period for all countries. In any case, the correla-
tion between GNP and GDP for the countries at hand is always at least 0.99 which makes them 
equivalent in the empirical analysis.  
12   An earlier analysis by Bowles and Jones (1992) looks separately at determinants for payments to the 
EU budget and EU own resources without the guidance of a specific economic model.  
   11
(5)  ,  
 where  () T
i i i i T E Y F − − =
i c 1 ()fz E d 1 Y i i i − =     
 where  ( )( ) Y c 1 E − − d f − = .  1
+ − −
i T  is the net contribution of jurisdiction i to the equalisation funds. Dividing T  by the 
population leads to the per-capita contribution 
i
(6)  , 
 where 
()()g e d 1 y c 1 t i i i + − − − =
( )( ) y c 1 e 1 − − d g − = ,  
and per-capita variables are denoted by lowercase letters:  
i i i Z T t = ,  i i i Z Y y = ,  i i i Z E = e ,  ∑ = =
n
1 j j Z Y y,   ∑ = =
n
1 j j Z E e.  
In words, net contributions to the EU depend on gross incomes of member states, EU 
income, member countries’ specific fiscal expenditures and EU specific expenditures 
(all variables in per-capita). Based on (6), the following empirical model is estimated: 
(7)  it t 4 it 3 t 2 it 1 it AGR AGR GDP GDP     ons contributi Net  ε + β + β + β + β = , 
 with  E = , i country index, t time index. 
2
t , i t , i Var and 0 σ = ε ε
Table 1 gives the results of estimating this model using ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  
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Tab. 1: Testing restrictions on equation (6) (Observations: 135) 
Variables  Coefficients  SEs  Robust SEs  Adjusted SEs
GDPit  0.007* (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
GDPt  -0.008* (0.004) (0.003)  (0.005) 
AGRit -37.4**  (4.04)  (5.2)  (13.8) 
AGRt 29.4**  (8.12)  (9.5)  (15.0) 
F-test F(4,131)=52.22**      
R
2 0.62       
Test:  2 1 β β − =    F(1,131)=0.53 F(1,131)=0.36  Chi
2(1)=0.19 
Test:  4 3 β β − =    F(1,131)=1.27 F(1,131)=0.99  Chi
2(1)=0.81 
Notes: *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.  
 
The coefficients reported in column 2 are all statistically significant using the 
normal standard errors (SEs) in column 3, and they display theoretically consistent 
signs. In the theoretical model, coefficients (1-d) and (1-c) have to be the same for 
income and expenditure on the individual and aggregate level, respectively.
13 In the 
empirical model, this implies testing the restrictions  4 3 2 1 and β − = β β − = β . The last 
two lines of the table report test statistics for these restrictions, and they cannot be 
rejected based on normal standard errors .  
However, there are potential difficulties related to the calculation of standard er-
rors. A typical problem in a panel framework is a violation of the homoscedasticity 
assumption ( ), i.e. the variance is not constant over all values of the 
independent variables. Column 4 presents robust standard errors based on the procedure 
2
t , i Var σ = ε
                                                 
13  Another restriction in the theoretical model is that c ≤ d. This will not hold in the empirical model, 
though, as in the theoretical model the coefficient refers to specific expenditures, while in the empiri-
cal model the share of agriculture in gross value added is used to proxy the specific needs.  
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pendent variables. Column 4 presents robust standard errors based on the procedure 
proposed by White (1980). The relative similarity of robust standard errors with normal 
standard errors shows that heteroscedasticity is not a major problem here.  
There is another issue related to deriving correct standard errors for variables 
sampled at different aggregation levels (EU aggregate vs. member country). The normal 
standard errors might be downward biased (see Moulton 1990). Appropriately adjusted 
standard errors are shown in the last column. Indeed, standard errors have increased 
substantially but the test for equality does still not reject. Thus in the following analysis, 
these restrictions are imposed on the model to increase the efficiency of the estimates.  
In other words, deviations from the EU average are used as regressors in the fi-
nal analysis. The estimated restricted model is: 
(8)  it t it 3 t it 1 it ) AGR AGR ( ) GDP GDP (     ons contributi Net  ε + − β + − β = , 
with  it i it u ν + = ε ,  
i u  unobservable individual specific effect,  it ν  remaining disturbance.  
The robustness of the estimation results is investigated by making different as-
sumptions about the error term of model (8). The between-effects model (BE) uses only 
the cross-sectional variation by averaging over the time dimension for each country. 
OLS1 is model (7) with the restrictions on the parameters imposed, OLS2 includes a 
constant, and OLS3 adds time dummies. Finally, FE is a fixed effects estimator (within-
effects estimator), which takes into account country dummies in addition to time dum-
mies.
14  
Table 2 shows that the coefficient on GDPit-GDPt is estimated relatively robust 
across different specifications. In accordance with the theoretical model, we get positive 
                                                 
14 See Baltagi (1995) for a discussion of different specifications for panel data models.  
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estimates, most of which are significant. The results are also quite consistent across 
differing empirical specifications in the case of AGRit-AGRt. In all regressions except 
for FE, the effect is negative, as we would expect from the theoretical model, and highly 
significant. Even after controlling for the variations in GDP, fiscal need is a powerful 
determinant of fiscal equalisation flows.  
 
Tab. 2: Explaining per-capita net contributions to EU budget 





















Constant  Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects  n.a.  No  No  Yes  Yes 












2  0.73 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.46 
Notes: *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. R
2’s are not directly comparable.  
 
However, there is a clear exception from this conclusion: the FE model.
15 After 
including country fixed-effects, the sign of the coefficient changes. It is worthwhile to 
                                                 
15 Employing a Hausman-test (Hausman 1978) leads to a rejection of a random-effects model in favour of 
the FE model (Chi
2(2) = 84**). 
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investigate the source for this sign reversal in somewhat more detail to better under-
stand what is going on.  
One can show that the parameter estimates for the country dummies are highly 
correlated with AGRit-AGRt (correlation coefficient is 0.90). This indicates that the 
fiscal equalisation scheme of the EU is geared towards compensating countries for a 
specific fiscal need. This explains the theoretically consistent negative coefficient ob-
tained in the other model specifications. In the FE model the redistribution aspect is 
captured by the country dummies, which are time invariant. After accounting for the 
static redistribution captured by the dummies, the AGRit-AGRt variable picks up reverse 
redistribution based on the variation across time.  
We interpret this finding as follows: the political process behind the compensa-
tion of specific fiscal needs is not flexible enough to allow for a continuous adjustment 
in the equalisation scheme. Due to the nature of the bargaining game going on between 
EU member countries, it is always easier to maintain the status quo than to introduce 
changes (see Molle 1997).  
Interpreting the empirical results within the context of our theoretical model of 
fiscal equalisation allows for a better understanding of this aspect of EU redistribution. 
The EU conforms to an ideal scheme of fiscal equalisation to the extent that GDP dif-
ferences matter, and so do specific fiscal needs in the form of a large agricultural bur-
den. However, redistribution is not continuously adjusted to account for changes in 
actual fiscal needs due to frictions arising from negotiations between sovereign gov-
ernments with veto power trying to protect their interests. In our view, this problem lies 
at the heart of many complaints about the equity of the current system. 
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IV.  Summary and conclusion 
Using an axiomatic approach, this paper derives a partial fiscal equalisation scheme that 
not only takes income into consideration but also allows for specific fiscal needs. The 
idealised theoretical model demonstrates that net contributions ought to depend on 
average union gross income, member states gross income, average union specific fiscal 
need, and members states specific fiscal needs. The derived functional form of the 
partial fiscal equalisation mechanism is similar to the scheme developed by Buhl and 
Pfingsten (1986, 1990, 1991). A major difference is, however, that the independence-of-
mergers-outside-the-jurisdiction axiom used in the present paper does not directly set up 
a Cauchy-type functional equation for income and fiscal need in all jurisdictions.  
  As a special case of our more general partial fiscal equalisation scheme, we 
derive a simple mechanism that relates net contributions to deviations of member state 
values for gross income and specific fiscal need from their respective union average that 
can be considered as an extension of the Buhl-Pfingsten scheme. 
We apply this idealised simple mechanism of partial fiscal equalisation to the 
European Union (EU), employing data from 1986 to 1997 for up to 14 countries. This is 
a particularly useful testing ground. One can compute net contributions from member 
states to the EU, and it is easy to identify the main fiscal need by analysing the EU 
budget. This investigation reveals that the agricultural sector plays the most prominent 
role in the EU budget. Consequently, we use the importance of the agricultural sector in 
the economy as an indicator of the fiscal need of a country.  
In the first step of a regression approach with net contributions to the EU budget 
as a dependent variable, it was found that the coefficients on aggregate EU GDP (agri-
cultural share) and member countries’ GDP (agricultural share) are of equal absolute 
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size. This restriction is in accordance with our theoretical priors and is then imposed on 
the empirical model in the second part of the analysis.  
The estimate of the effect of the deviation of individual member states’ GDP 
from EU average on net contributions is positive. Thus, relatively richer countries pay 
more to the EU than poorer countries, as demanded in the idealised theoretical model. 
For the specific need proxy, the deviation of the agricultural gross value added from EU 
average, we find a negative parameter in most specifications: the larger the fiscal need, 
the lower the net contributions are. The sign gets reversed, however, in the case of a 
model including country dummies. Our interpretation of this finding is that although 
there is redistribution in line with the idealised theoretical model, the EU fiscal equali-
sation scheme does not continuously update to changes of actual fiscal needs.  
To conclude, the EU equalisation scheme does to a certain extent conform to an 
idealised fiscal equalisation scheme based on a number of reasonable axioms. Hence 
general complaints about the system being unfair are not warranted. Instead, our analy-
sis allows a more careful identification of the deficiency. It is the lack of adjustment to a 
change in the relative fiscal need that prevents the system from complying with the 
idealised equalisation scheme at all points in time.  
In our opinion, this has a lot to do with the inability of the political process to 
reverse the status of countries from net recipient to net contributor. Perhaps it would be 
a useful idea to take actual fiscal equalisation away from the political bargaining agenda 
and hand it over to a more automatic mechanism or the EU Commission. Unfortunately, 
strong national interests guided by thinking in terms of keeping the status quo are likely 
going to torpedo such a suggestion.  
With EU enlargement approaching, distributional issues are going to become 
even more important. Thus, institutional reforms appear to be necessary before new 
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member states enter the political bargaining process. Otherwise, the EU might not only 
run into problems of limited finances but also of violating distributional ideals. The lack 
of fairness with regard to burden sharing might undermine the willingness of countries 
to contribute to the EU budget and exacerbate the financial problems after enlargement. 
One can also envision a change of policy preferences regarding the specification of 
fiscal need at the EU level. This would require, however, an unanimous agreement by 
national policy makers.  
It should be emphasised that we do not argue EU expenditures are necessarily 
used efficiently. As has been pointed out many times before, especially the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) is characterised by a number of shortcomings when evalu-
ated using an efficiency criterion. In fact, most of the studies analysing the European 
budget have centred on the aspect of efficiency. However, we think that one should also 
take distributional aspects into account. Consequently, we propose that a desirable CAP 
reform ought to improve efficiency while maintaining the general distributional aspects 
of the current system, conditional on a more regular updating of net transfers according 
to changes in fiscal need.  
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Appendix 
Proof of theorem 1 
Theorem 1 will be proved step by step. From (A5) follows 
  () ( ) n 1 n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 n 1 i z , , z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F K K K K K K = . 
Using (A6) repeatedly,  
  .  ()
() 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
n 1 n 1 n 1 1
z 1 , 0 , , 0 , z , E E , 0 , , 0 , E , Y Y , 0 , , 0 , Y F
Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F
− − − = K K K
K K K
can be derived. Generalising this result and taking the anonymity axiom (A4) into ac-
count, one derives the following Lemma: 
Lemma 1: Net income functions  ,  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F n , , 1 i K =  satisfy properties (A4), (A5) 
and (A6), only if there exists a function  ℜ → ℜ +
5 : F ~  so that for all i,  ,  n , , 1 i K =
  () ( ) i i i n 1 n 1 n 1 i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F = K K K . # 
Moreover, the existence of the function  ( ) i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F
~
 guarantees that net-income 
functions satisfy properties (A3) and (A4).  
Since (A5) requires that a merger between two jurisdictions i and j should not af-
fect any other jurisdiction,  
 
() ()
() () 0 , E , 0 , Y , 0 F ~ z z , E , E E , Y , Y Y F ~
z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~
j i j i j i
j j j i i i
+ + + + =
+
 
is a necessary and sufficient condition. Referring to the empty-jurisdiction property 
(A1), the following Lemma can be stated immediately.  
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Lemma 2: Net income functions  ,  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F n , , 1 i K =  satisfy properties (A1), 
(A4), (A5) and (A6), if and only if 
() ( ) i z i i E , E , Y , Y F n 1 n 1 n 1 i , ~ Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F = K K K , n , , 1 i K = , if  () 0 0 , E , 0 , Y , 0 F
~
=  
and if for all i, j,  n , , 1 i K = ,  ,  n , , 1 j K =
  () () ( ) j i j i j i j j j i i i z z , E , E E , Y , Y Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ + + + = + . # 
Hence, the net income function F ~  is a generalised Cauchy function and a basic result 
from the theory on functional equations can be applied: 
Lemma 3: Net income functions F ,  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : n , , 1 i K =  satisfy properties (A1) till 
(A6), only if  () ( ) i i 1 n 1 i z , E , i E , Y , Y F n 1 n
~ Z , , Z , E K , , E , Y , , Y F K K = ,  , and if 
there exist functions  
n , , 1 i K =
  , where  , 
  , where  , 
( E , Y f f Y Y =
( E , Y f f E E =
)
)
ℜ → ℜ +
2
Y : f
ℜ → ℜ +
2
E : f
so that,  
  () i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~  
  () i E Y i z E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f 1 E E , Y E i Y f Y E , Y f − = . #  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] − − − +
Proof: Using the previous lemma, taking into account that according to (A3) F
~
 is 
bounded on the interval [-E, Y] and applying the basic theorem on generalised Cauchy 
equations [see Aczél (1966), p. 34 and p. 215 and Eichhorn (1978), p. 51], yields 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) i z i E i Y i i i z E , Y f E E , Y f Y E , Y f z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ + − = , 
where f . Using (A2),   ℜ → ℜ +
2
z :
   
 
( ) () () () [] E Y z E , Y f E E , Y f Y E , Y f z , E , E , Y , Y F ~
n
1 i
i z i E i Y
n
1 i
i i i − = + − =∑ ∑
= =
() () () ( ) ( )E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f 1 E , Y f E Y z − − − = ⇒ . QED. 
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Proof of theorem 2 
(a) Since   and either   or   can be set equal to zero, the monotonicity properties of 
 and   can be obtained immediately from the inspection of 
i z
E f
i Y i E
Y f () i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~  
() () ( ) () ( ) ( ) [] i E Y E i Y z E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f E , Y f , Y i E 1 Y E f − − − + − = . 
(b) For  () i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ () ( ) ( )( )( ) i i i E i i Y z E Y Ez E E , Y f Yz Y E , Y f − + − − − =
i i Yz = i i Ez E
,   and 
 are chosen such that   and 
i Y
i E Y = . If   f o r  s o m e  j  ≠ i is varied by ∆, the 
change in 
j Y
() i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~  is equal to  ( ) [ ] ∆ ∆ + − i Y z E , Y f 1
j i j
. Hence from monotonicity 
with respect to income Y , with  ≠ , follows  ( ) 1 E , Y Y f ≤ ∆ +  and, therefore, 
. If   is varied by ∆ instead, the change in  ( E , Y ) 1 ≤ i Y fY ( ) i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~  is equal to 
() [] () ∆ ∆ + + ∆ ∆ + f z E , Y Y i − 1 E , Y i z
i
fY . Since   might be arbitrarily close to zero, 
monotonicity with respect to income Y  demands  ( ) 0 E , Y fY ≥ ∆ +  and thus 
. Hence, (A7) ensures  () 0 ≥ E , Y fY ( ) 1 E , Y f 0 Y ≤ ≤ . Analogously (A8) requires 
.   QED.  () 1 E , Y ≤ fE 0 ≤
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Monotonicity properties of (3) 












































































































































































































The term in square brackets can be written as  ( ) Y ϕ , where  ( ) 0 E = ϕ . Since 

















0 Z F i i > ∂ ∂  holds for Y > E. 
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